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Abstract Several factors potentially responsible for the failure to conclude the Doha
Round of multilateral trade negotiations are analyzed. A two-stage negotiation and
ratification game between the “North” (industrialized countries) and the “South” (de-
veloping countries) is employed and collapses into a single diagram. The choice of
negotiating agenda, principles, and currency of the Doha Round interact with domestic
political factors in leading WTO members, the fast growth of exports prior to 2007, and
pervasive unilateral trade reform to eliminate the “landing zone” for this particular
multilateral negotiation. Recent emphasis on differences between developing countries
and on Chinese WTO accession as independent causes of the impasse seems misplaced.
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1 Introduction
Nearly every economic analysis of trade negotiations concerns those that have been
concluded with an agreement to cut trade barriers. The emphasis, then, has tended to be
on the rationale for trade agreements and the effects of their implementation. Far less
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attention has been given to what might be referred to as the “basis of the deal” (who gets
what in return for what) and the factors conducive to bringing negotiations to a
successful conclusion.1
This omission would be less glaring were it not for the fact that one of the
most significant events in the multilateral trading system during the past 10 years
has been the failure to conclude the Doha Development Agenda. This Agenda was
formally launched in fraught circumstances at a WTO Ministerial meeting in
November 2001, itself following a divisive meeting of WTO members in Seattle
in 1999. While this round of multilateral trade negotiations was formally launched
in 2001, it was not until after a WTO Ministerial meeting collapsed in Cancun in
2003 that the contents of the negotiating agenda could be agreed upon in mid-
2004 (in the so-called July Package.)
Some progress was then made in negotiations—notably with respect to the phasing
out of agricultural export subsidies and, subsequently, trade facilitation measures—but
as this negotiation is governed by a Single Undertaking, no obligations will come into
effect until every related matter has been settled by the WTO membership. In fact,
reaching a final accord has not been possible, with growing acrimony between leading
WTO members since 2008, at that time over special provisions to protect farmers in
developing countries and, more generally, over the appropriate degree of liberalization
by different types of WTO members.
As of this writing, even though the odds of successfully concluding this negotiation
have lengthened, no government has formally called for work on the Doha
Development Agenda to cease. There appears to be no appetite among WTO members
to bring these negotiations to a fruitful conclusion, nor to end them. Attempts to salvage
parts of the negotiation have been rebuffed.
As this potted history shows, there have been several deadlocks in the Doha Round
negotiations—with respect to the launch of the negotiation, setting the negotiating agenda,
finalizing the negotiation with its original scope, and subsequently, finalizing parts of the
original negotiating agenda. The subject matter of this paper is confined to the limited
likelihood2 witnessed in recent years of concluding the Doha Roundwith its original scope.3
Three features characterize this particular impasse (a) the emergence of disagreement
between leading jurisdictions after the negotiation commenced, 4 (b) several failed
1 Although the focus of this paper is on the Doha Round it is worth noting that in recent years it
was not possible to conclude successfully the negotiation of several free trade agreements. Some
negotiations failed outright (US-South Africa), some were never launched after initial discussions
highlighted stumbling blocks (US-Switzerland), and other negotiations that were launched have
dragged on and on with no end in sight (EU-Mercosur). Such instances might provide additional
insights into the causes of failed trade negotiations. None of these cases, however, are on the scale
of the Doha Development Agenda, perhaps limiting their relevance to the matters considered in this
paper.
2 Despite the use of words such as “likelihood” in the characterization of a negotiating impasse, the simple
model presented in this paper is deterministic.
3 My focus here is on the entire negotiation, not an element of it. There may well be particular reasons why
some policies are less amenable to inclusion in legally binding international accords. Hoekman (2008) makes
such a case for service sector regulations, negotiations concerning which have made very little progress in the
Doha Round.
4 The existence of disagreement alone may not indicate that the negotiation is doomed to failure. After all, it is
well known that bargaining models where players face uncertainty over key parameters can endogenously
induce delays.
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attempts5 to resolve those differences (even if some narrowing of those differ-
ences has been observed6), and (c) the likelihood that future attempts will fail
as well. Therefore a negotiation, that the parties presumably thought initially
had some chance of success, is unlikely to be concluded on anything like the
scale originally envisaged, if it is concluded at all.7 Implicit in this character-
ization is the suggestion that circumstances have arisen that were not anticipat-
ed when the negotiation began. Among others, two unanticipated factors will be
emphasized in what follows.
Existing literature provides the rationale for several of the building blocks of the
approach taken here. First, a two-stage process of international negotiation and then
domestic ratification is employed, so that forward-looking negotiators keep an eye on
the consequences of any concessions they make for the extent of domestic support for
the potential final accord (Putnam 1988 more generally and, in the Doha Round
context, Elsig and Dupont 2011).8 The approach taken here is designed so as to allow
considerations pertinent to both stages of the game to be collapsed into a single
diagram.
Second, I emphasize the “North–South” or “industrialized country versus develop-
ing country” dimension of the Doha Round negotiation, as do Bagwell and Staiger
(2012), Blustein (2009), Hufbauer and Schott (2012a), Ismail (2012), and Schwab
(2011), among others.9 The central matter here is the extent to which different classes of
WTO members should make comparable contributions to the Doha Round package.
This modelling choice does not imply that the “North” or the “South” were always
cohesive coalitions.10
Third, key features of the WTO are highlighted here, such as the widely (if not
universally) held view that any Doha Round accord must adhere to the principle of Less
Than Full Reciprocity (Lamy 2008; Bhagwati and Sutherland 2011). The importance of
bindings as the negotiating currency of the WTO at a time when there are substantial
differences between bound and applied policies–a factor emphasized by, among others,
Young (2010) and by associations of American and European manufacturers–is con-
sidered as well.
Fourth, the inability to conclude an agreement is treated in a degenerate manner. I
identify factors that frustrate ratification or that are incompatible with the widely
accepted negotiating principles of the Doha Round. That is, in the language of
5 There has certainly been resort to “deadlines” that seek to induce movement by the parties, the very type of
“action forcing” events that Narlikar (2010) refers to.
6 For example, in 2008 the Director-General of the WTO claimed that 80 % of the matters to be negotiated had
been settled. Unfortunately, assuming that WTO members stick to their plan to conclude the negotiation as a
Single Undertaking, it is necessary to agree on all matters. Even agreement on 99 % of all matters is, in
principle, not enough.
7 There is no suggestion here that the three features of the current Doha Round impasse are similar to those
deadlocks that took place earlier in the Doha Round, that were mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph in
the main text.
8 As former senior US trade diplomat Grant Aldonas has written “One of the great ironies of the international
trading system is that it is really a question of grappling with domestic politics. That reality filters through to
the basic way in which we bargain” (Aldonas 2007, page 31).
9 Here I depart from Young (2010), who emphasizes the political considerations affecting the evaluation of
Doha Round negotiating offers in the United States and the European Union.
10 Page et al. (2008) document, for example, differences in the position of various groups of developing
countries with respect to the contents of a “development package” for the Doha Round.
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international political economy research, I identify circumstances where no “win set”
between the parties exists (Elsig and Dupont 2011).
Although the reception at home to an agreement negotiated with trading partners is
given prominence in what follows, this does not deny the importance that domestic
actors may attribute to economic considerations.11 In this regard, the demonstration by
Bagwell and Staiger (2012) of the incompatibility of the goal expanding developing
country exports with certain trade-offs in the negotiating set of the Doha Round is
important as it calls into question what the Doha Round could ever achieve. Empirical
analyses in recent years that reduced the estimated value of the trade and GDP created
by extant Doha Round negotiating proposals have likely influenced the perception of
policymakers in key jurisdictions as well (Anderson et al. 2009; Hufbauer et al. 2010;
Decreux and Fontagné 2011; Martin and Mattoo 2011).12
Not every argument in the literature on the Doha Round is taken up in the analysis
below,13 leaving plenty of room for further research. Harbinson (2012), for example,
emphasizes a tactical mistake in allowing certain negotiations to drag on so that, with
the passage of time, the original Doha Round negotiating agenda seemed less and less
relevant. An IMF analysis noted “Consensus has been difficult to achieve partly
because of changed geopolitical circumstances” (IMF 2011), language that is
probably code for the fast growth of Chinese exports and output in the decade after
the Doha Round was launched.
In his analysis of the public disagreement over agricultural safeguards in 2008 and of
the July 2008 WTO ministerial meeting Wolfe (2009a, b) blames insufficient time to
prepare ministers for difficult decisions rather than deeper policy choices, such as
adherence to the Single Undertaking.14 In contrast, Hufbauer and Schott (2012b) argue
the Single Undertaking is the “fatal flaw” of the Doha Round. Earlier they contended
that the lack of progress in negotiating service sector reforms diminished industrial
country interest in the Doha Round (Hufbauer and Schott 2012a). Bagwell and Staiger
(2012) note that, for manufactured goods, at present industrialized countries maintain
much lower tariffs than most developing countries and that the former are running out
of negotiating coin.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
model’s two-stage structure and focuses on the factors affecting the domestic ratifica-
tion stage and the degenerate notion of an impasse employed here. The third section
11 Still, as Aldonas (2007) notes, “Although we know that trade is a two-way street, we bargain as if it is a one-
way thoroughfare. Negotiators attempt to gain as much as possible for their export interests, while defending
their politically sensitive industries from imports. In short, we take a non-zero-sum world and turn it into a
zero-sum game” (page 7).
12 In the years after the Doha Round was launched new data on the size of trade barriers became available for
Computable General Equilibrium models and the resulting “headline” estimates of the gains from completing
this multilateral trade negotiation fell (Ackerman and Gallagher 2008). In more recent years, more information
on the degree of trade barrier adjustment by different types of WTO member implied by latter negotiating
proposals led a further revision downward in the magnitude of the gains to the larger trading powers.
13 Tarullo (2006) is a prescient, early assessment of the difficulties in negotiating the Doha Development
Agenda.
14 Wolfe (2007) cannot conceive of the WTO without the Single Undertaking, arguing that it is inherent in the
manner in which WTO members negotiate with one another. Hence, in his view, blaming the Single
Undertaking for the Doha Round’s travails misses the point.
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shows that the interaction between an important negotiating principle of the Doha
Round and domestic political factors can generate impasses.
The fourth section considers the implications of domestic political changes in major
industrialized countries that took place from 2006 on. The fifth section identifies factors
that affected the outside options of the North and the South after the Doha Round was
launched and before the global financial crisis reduced world trade in 2009. The sixth
section shows that the use of bound policies rather than applied policies as the
negotiating currency in the Doha Round can result in sustained unilateral trade reform
becoming a stumbling block to concluding multilateral trade negotiations. Intra-South
dynamics, including reactions to China’s growing export prowess, are discussed in the
seventh section. Concluding comments and policy implications are presented in section
eight.
2 A simple two-stage game that can generate impasses
For the purposes of this paper, I take the Doha Round to be a negotiation between two
countries, the North (an industrialized country) and the South (a developing country.)
To further simplify matters, I assume that all of the complexity of national commercial
policies can be collapsed into a single index which, for historical reasons only, I refer to
as tariffs. A proposed Doha Round deal, then, is a pair of actual tariff cuts, which can be
represented graphically as a point in the positive quadrant of R2.
The international negotiation takes place in stage one and domestic ratification is
considered in stage two. Negotiators are forward-looking and, in the deterministic
framework employed here, can see if a proposed deal is acceptable to enough domestic
constituencies to be ratified. Reciprocal trade barrier reduction is assumed to hurt some
domestic commercial interests and benefit others. Here national political systems,
however constituted, aggregate the reactions of the winners and losers from any
proposed Doha deal and determine whether or not a deal will be ratified.
I represent the political factors at work in the second stage by a ratification constraint
(RC), see Fig. 1. For every potential tariff cut by the North, the minimum actual tariff
cut by the South necessary to generate enough political support to get an accord with
this pair of tariff cuts ratified in the North is established. Although the ratification
constraint is drawn as convex in Fig. 1, in fact, the only assumption that seems
reasonable is that such constraints be monotonic. That is, the minimum tariff cut by
the South necessary to generate enough support in the North for ratification is assumed
to be higher in potential Doha Round deals where the North cuts its own tariffs by
more.
In Fig. 1 any pair of tariff cuts on or above the ratification constraint of the North is
politically acceptable to the North. Points above the North’s ratification constraint are
associated with more tariff cuts by the South and therefore more gains to Northern
commercial interests. A relaxation of the North’s ratification constraint would involve
shifting the constraint down vertically in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 1 the no agreement outcome is represented by the origin, point (0,0). If the
North’s ratification constraint were to be drawn so as to cut the vertical axis above the
origin, then, to induce a move away from the no-agreement status quo, it would imply
that political factors in the North require that the South must agree to cut its tariffs by a
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minimum, positive amount. The more attractive the status quo is—perhaps because the
North’s exports are growing faster independently of the multilateral trade negotiation—
the larger will be this minimum tariff cut by the South (but more on this matter in
section 5).
The calculus underlying the ratification constraint is as follows. Foreign commercial
policy reform will benefit some domestic interests, who then lobby for ratification—in
so doing, they oppose the losers from domestic commercial policy concessions in the
negotiation. The extent to which the domestic government compensates losers through
national tax and welfare systems undercuts opposition to the deal and may lower the
minimum tariff cut expected of the trading partner, so relaxing the ratification con-
straint. The extent to which supply side failings at home and trade facilitation bottle-
necks abroad limit the extent to which domestic interests can take advantage of foreign
tariff cuts will increase domestic demands of their trading partner, represented graph-
ically by a tightening of the ratification constraint at home.15
The political arrangements a jurisdiction has for considering trade deals can affect
the ratification constraint. The Fast Track Authority conferred in the past by the US
Congress on that nation’s Federal Government is generally believed to have eased
Congressional approval of trade agreements (Destler 2005). Therefore, the loss of that
Authority during the Doha Round can be represented here as a tightening of the North’s
ratification constraint. Likewise, as a result of implementing the Treaty of Lisbon, the
ratification of European Union trade deals by the European Parliament could cause the
North’s ratification constraint to shift vertically up.
Changes in the negotiating set after the formal negotiation began may alter ratifica-
tion constraints as well. Suppose an item was added to the negotiation that benefits
primarily the North’s commercial interests. On the assumption that the negotiation on
the new item is concluded successfully, should the North require less domestic com-
mercial support for the remainder of the negotiating package, then the minimum tariff
Fig. 1 Represent domestic political factors with “ratification constraints” (RC)
15 This opens the door for supply side reforms and Aid For Trade initiatives to shift the ratification constraint.
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cut that the North must demand of the South on the original items in the negotiating set
is reduced, relaxing the North’s ratification constraint. Such considerations may be of
use in assessing proposals to add or drop negotiating items from the Doha Round.
Other than monotonicity of the ratification constraint, I do not put any more structure
on the political process in the North and South than this. This has both a drawback and
an advantage. The drawback is that this approach does not unpack the factors that
determine the minimum tariff cut by the negotiating partner needed to secure ratifica-
tion at home. The advantage of this approach is that monotonicity of ratification
constraints may be a property of different types of political system. Therefore, this
Fig. 2 Ratification constraints can allow for “Landing Zone”
Fig. 3 An impasse: no landing zone
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analysis is not tied to any one particular model of the political economy of trade policy
formation.
The ratification constraints of the North and South can be represented in the same
diagram, as shown in Fig. 2. All of the points on or below the South’s ratification
constraint are politically viable in the South. Combining the North and South´s
ratification constraints reveals which, if any, tariff cutting deals negotiated in the first
stage can survive the domestic ratification process in the second stage. Figure 2 reveals
what some trade practitioners refer to as the “landing zone,” namely, tariff cutting deals
that meet both nations’ ratification constraints. Since impasses are the focus of this
paper, I invoke no further assumptions to determine which point in the landing zone is
selected during the negotiation.
An impasse arises when there is no tariff cutting deal that satisfies simultaneously
each nation’s ratification constraint. Two ratification constraints that generate an im-
passe are drawn in Fig. 3. Thus, impasses are possible without invoking any of the
features of the Doha Round. However, to make matters interesting, I start with the case
the North and South’s ratification constraints alone generate a landing zone. In what
follows I add features that reduce—and in some cases—eliminate the set of potential
Doha Round deals.
3 The less than full reciprocity principle of the Doha Round
When the Doha Development Agenda was launched in November 2001, considerable
attention was given to the interests of developing countries.16 One tangible manifesta-
tion of this commitment was that developing countries would be expected to liberalize
their trade regimes by less than industrialized countries. In the context of the negoti-
ations on manufactured goods, this was enshrined in the Less Than Full Reciprocity
Principle. 17 Given that the differential treatment of industrialized and developing
countries has become a particularly contentious matter, it is worth examining the
implications for the landing zone of adopting this negotiating principle.
A further assumption must be made so as to represent that Principle graphically. At
this stage, it is worth recalling that in a speech to parliamentarians in 2008, the Director-
General of the WTO, noted18:
“I hasten to add that all efforts in the Doha Round would have been made in
accordance with the principle of Less than Full Reciprocity, with the developed
world making 2/3ds of the contribution, and the emerging part of the developing
world only 1/3d.”
16 The words “developed” and “developing” are littered throughout the November 2001 Ministerial
Declaration that launched the Doha Development Agenda. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_
e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm
17 Subsequently, different groups of developing countries have been able to negotiate different levels of
liberalization and in some instances, no reform is expected of certain categories of developing countries.
Recall, also, that a WTO member can elect to have developing country status.
18 See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl99_e.htm
150 S.J. Evenett
Suppose that the above statement is interpreted as requiring that the North cut its
tariffs by at least twice the tariff cut of the South.19 On this interpretation, the Less Than
Full Reciprocity Principle can be imposed as an additional constraint on the set of
possible tariff cutting deals. Figure 4 shows the bite that this requirement has.
Essentially, all of the tariff deals above the LTFR line violate this negotiating principle.
The set of Doha Deals is necessarily restricted, but does an impasse result?
Not necessarily. As Fig. 5 shows, it is possible for some of the original landing zone
to survive the imposition of a LTFR rule. However, with either a tighter LTFR rule (see
Fig. 6) or a more restrictive Northern ratification constraint, the set of acceptable tariff
deals can be eliminated. Indeed, in many of the figures that follow, the interaction
between the Northern ratification constraint and the LTFR rule determines the outcome.
The imposition of a negotiating principle, agreed at the beginning of this multilateral
trade negotiation with the noble goal of skewing the eventual deal in the favor of
developing countries, can in fact preclude such deals being concluded in the first place.
A few more comments on the LTFR rule are in order. First, if one objects to my
characterization of this rule, then surely a necessary condition for a LTFR rule in tariff
cutting space is that it lie below the 45° line. If so, then this restricts the set of potential deals
as well, but not in the same way.
Second, given the imposition of the LTFR limits the tariff benefits that the North can
receive from Southern reform, then one might wonder why the North agreed to this
Principle in the first place. One potential explanation is that developing countries may
have made the acceptance of this Principle one of the “prices” that had to be paid for the
launch of the Doha Round. Since many developing country officials appear to believe
that their countries were short changed during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiation, then the adoption of this rule might have been seen as offering some
reassurance as to the outcome of the Doha Round.
Third, once the restrictive nature of the LTFR rule became clear, questions must surely
arise as to why the North continued to adhere to it and how the South was able to hold
together its collective support for the rule. As to the former, the attempts by the United States
later in the Doha Round to increase the contribution of the large emerging markets (through
calls, for example, for the addition of a wide range of sectoral deals to eliminate tariffs) can
be interpreted as an attempt to break free from the LTFR constraint. In doing so the US
received some support from other industrialized countries, but many of the latter appeared
less vexed by the development objectives of the Doha Round. Perhaps the latter
industrialized countries worried that developing countries might walk away from the
Doha Round negotiations should the Less Than Full Reciprocity Principle be abandoned.
4 Declining support for trade reform in North and South
It is striking that several analysts have pointed to reductions in public support for open
borders and trade reform in certain leading jurisdictions from 2005. These shifts appear
19 I accept that the quotation above could be interpreted in other ways. For examples, the contribution need not
be the level of tariff cut, but the estimated increase in tariff volume or the extent to which tariff revenues are
expected to fall. The latter two criteria were used to interpret the relative contributions of developing and
industrialized economies during the previous multilateral trade negotiation, the Uruguay Round.
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not to have been anticipated at the time of the launch of the Doha Round and, therefore,
are likely to shift the ratification constraints of the North and the South.
Young (2010) documents some of the evidence of and factors responsible for the
falling support for trade reform in the United States and in the European Union. In the
US, the 2006 midterm Congressional election saw a number of pro-trade elected
representatives replaced by persons more skeptical of trade reform (Evenett and
Meier 2006). In addition, the lapsing of Fast Track Authority was said to have
complicated the Congressional approval of trade deals (Tarullo 2006; Schwab 2011).
Horse trading in the Indian parliament to ensure a vote of confidence in that country’s
government is said to have implicated Indian commercial policies in 2008. Furthermore,
having remained quiet during its first five years of WTOmembership, from 2006 on China
Fig. 4 What bite does the LTFR requirement have?
Fig. 5 Combine ratification constraints and LTFR: a restricted landing zone
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began to assert its interests more publicly. The diminished stature of the Ministry of Foreign
Commerce in the Chinese government in the years following accession to the WTO was
also said to give line ministry and sectoral ministries greater clout in Beijing.
These factors tighten the ratification constraints in the North and the South so as to
reduce the set of potentially acceptable tariff cutting deals, as shown in Fig. 7.
5 Faster export growth during the Doha Round era than before
The acceleration of China’s rate of economic growth, and later that of India’s, in the
years running up to the global financial crisis added to world economic growth and to
world trade. These emerging markets were not alone in experiencing faster rates of
Fig. 6 An impasse can result with certain LTFR rules
Fig. 7 Greater domestic opposition to trade reform and the ratification constraint
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economic growth, creating export opportunities for trading partners. The result was that for
many jurisdictions—including the European Union, the Least Developed group of coun-
tries, as well as China and India—their exports grew at a quicker pace during the pre-crisis
years of theDohaRound than during the earlier UruguayRound. For example, from 2001 to
2007 EU exports grew on average 12 % per annum, compared to falling 2 % per annum
during the Uruguay Round. The only large jurisdiction for which this was not the case was
the United States, whichmay account in part for the persistence with which it has advocated
a Doha Round outcome that results in substantial trade reform.
The faster rates of non-Doha-related export growth affected the value of the “no
deal” status quo in the eyes of political decision makers. What is not denied is that
successful completion of the Doha Round is likely to have raised export growth rates.
But decision makers may be tempted to ask whether increasing the annual rate of
exports from 12 to 13 %, for example, provides much political payoff compared to the
likely opposition to a trade deal. Moreover exporters, that typically lobby for trade
deals may find it difficult enough to supply existing orders during such a boom and so
place a lower value on the additional exports that a trade deal brings.20 In sum, the
willingness of exporters and the like to lobby may be conditional on the underlying rate
of growth of overseas sales. If so, the pre-crisis global boom may have made finding a
landing zone for the Doha Round more difficult, as portrayed in Fig. 8.
6 Unilateral trade reform and the negotiating currency of the Doha Round
The negotiating currency of the WTO relates specifically to bindings. Governments
negotiate the maximum levels of tariffs than can be imposed on imported manufactured
goods and the maximum tariffs, quotas, and subsidies that can be employed in national
20 For what it is worth, in a 2005 meeting with the Swiss Federal Counsellor responsible for trade policy I made this
point andwas immediately, and unexpectedly, supported by the representative of the largest group of Swiss exporters.
Fig. 8 Faster export growth independent of the DDA contracts the landing zone
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agricultural policy. WTO rules do not prevent a government from setting a policy
instrument below the maximum allowable level.
Indeed, differences between the maximum bound and the applied levels are so
common that they are referred to as a “binding overhang.” The extent of the binding
overhang on tariffs on manufactured goods for the five largest developing economies is
reported in Table 1. Except for China, by 2008 the other large emerging markets set
average applied tariff rates well below the maximum allowable levels.
What is the significance of such binding overhangs for the Doha Round of trade
negotiations? In principle, agreements to cut bindings need not result in applied tariffs being
cut. For example, the halving of a bound tariff rate of 20%will not automatically result in a cut
in the applied tariff if the latter is 10 % or less. The reduction in the bound rate is valuable to
foreign commercial interests if they attach a positive probability to the applied tariff ever being
raised above the new, lower bound tariff rate. It is for this reason that many economic analysts
21 have pointed to the uncertainty-reducing benefits of cutting tariff bindings (as well as the
traditional benefits that arise when bound rates are cut below prevailing applied tariff rates.)
During the Doha Round several factors have come together than have undermined
this logic. First, unilateral cuts by developing countries in tariffs on imported manu-
factures as well as unilateral subsidy cuts for farmers by the EU and the US have been
extensive, in turn creating substantial binding overhangs. Second, the existing binding
overhangs in manufacturing and agriculture are so large that in many cases they exceed
the proposed Doha Round cuts in bindings.
Third, US and EU exporters have repeatedly stated that they place little or no value
on cuts in bindings that do not cut applied tariff rates (Young 2010; Schwab 2011).22
Table 1 Except China, large emerging markets have large “binding overhangs”
Rank Country Mean bound tariff rate on
NAMA (%)
Mean applied tariff rate on
NAMA (%)
Cut needed to create business
opportunities
1. China 9.1 9.1 0.00
2. India 36.2 11.5 68.2
3. Mexico 34.9 11.2 67.9
4. Brazil 30.8 12.5 59.4
5. Turkey 16.9 4.8 71.6
Source: WTO Trade Profiles, April 2008
21 In this regardMesserlin (2008) addresses the benefits of binding trade policies in the context of aDohaRound deal.
22 The difference between bound and applied rates of tariffs is explicitly referred to in the position papers of leading
industrial trade groups on liberalizing manufactured goods trade. For example, in a paper dated January 2010 the US
National Association of Manufacturers stated
The Doha Round would cut the tariffs of the advanced developing countries somewhere between 1/8
and 1/10—not insignificant but not likely to generate large new trade flows. This is particularly the
case since the tariff cuts will come from the higher official “bound” rates and in many cases these cuts
will not equal the applied rates for up to 10 years. In the meantime U.S. exporters will see little benefit.
This position note included charts for China, India, and Brazil purporting to show the intertemporal path
of actual and bound tariffs should prevailing Doha Round tariff proposals be implemented. This position paper
can be accessed at http://www.nam.org/~/media/C41A4C1BC77741D8826AA40DFEF66AB1/NAM_
Position_on_the_Doha_Round.pdf
The Doha Round impasse: A graphical account 155
Implicitly, these lobbies discount the possibility that the unilateral tariff reforms of the
larger developing countries will be reversed. Influential US legislators have called for
cuts in applied tariff rates, specifically pointing out that bound tariff cuts are not enough
(see, for example, Grassley 2007). Fourth, leading developing countries have stated that
they will not “pay” for unilateral reductions in subsidies to industrial country farmers,
arguing that those subsidies were illegitimate in the first place.23 In short, neither the
North nor the South are willing to pay for the other’s unilateral reforms.
How can this be analyzed in the framework developed here? Recall, the
ratification constraints are defined in terms of actual tariff cuts. To translate the
minimum actual tariff cut by a trading partner into the minimum binding tariff
cut, one must add the size of the binding overhang of the trading partner.
Therefore, if the North requires the South to cut its applied tariffs by at least
3 % and the existing tariff binding overhang in the South is 5 %, then the
North must demand that the South will cut its bound rate by the sum, namely,
8 %. Graphically, this amounts to vertically translating the North’s ratification
constraint by the size of the current binding overhang in the South, as shown in
Fig. 9. A similar (in this case rightward translation) of the South’s ratification
constraint is necessary when there exists a Northern binding overhang (as there
is in agricultural subsidies.)
The effect of shifting up the North’s ratification constraint is to reduce the set of
possible trade deals that satisfy both the binding-adjusted ratification constraint and the
LTFR rule. The significance of Fig. 9 is that it shows how domestic political constraints
interact with two well-known features of the Doha Round (binding overhang and the
LTFR negotiating principle) so as to reduce the set of possible mutually acceptable
Doha Round outcomes.
Moreover, every time the South engages in unilateral trade reform (and many
developing countries have done so during the Doha Round), then this induces the
North to ratchet up its negotiating demands. As Fig. 10 shows, the process of unilateral
trade reform in the South can go so far that no mutually acceptable Doha Round deal is
possible–an impasse results. In this case, the combination of unilateral trade reform and
bindings being the negotiating currency of the WTO create a stumbling block for
multilateral trade reform. Taking account of this central feature of the WTO system
effectively introduces a tension between two forms of trade reform that many econo-
mists have usually supported without reservation.
It is worth stressing here that this outcome is not the “fault” of Southern unilateral
tariff reform. Bearing in mind that unilateral reform of agricultural subsidies has
occurred as well, the problem here is the unwillingness of the North and the South to
23 For example, in 2007 the Indian Minister of Commerce stated “I do hope that the US moves forward in
addressing the issue of domestic support, domestic subsidies because you cannot be talking of fair trade and
continue with domestic subsidies.” See http://www.indianexpress.com/news/us-should-be-open-to-farm-
subsidy-cuts-kamal-nath/33970. Another news report on deliberations in June 2007 stated that “Kamal
Nath, the Indian trade minister, said the United States had offered to cap its domestic agricultural subsidies
at $17 billion, considerably lower than the $22 billion it had offered before, but still well above the roughly
$11 billion that American farmers are currently receiving. Nath said that offer had “no logic or equity,” a point
his Brazilian counterpart, Celso Amorim, echoed.” See http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/
worldbusiness/21iht-wto.4.6264066.html?_r=0. Another news report making specific reference to binding
and applied subsidy levels of the United States can be found at http://www.domain-b.com/economy/trade/
20080723_kamal_nath.html
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“pay” for each other’s unilateral trade reforms–effectively denying the uncertainty-
reducing value of lowered bindings.
7 China’s accession to the WTO, subsequent export growth, and intra-South
dynamics
In recent years some analysts have contended that the fast growth of Chinese exports since
that country joined the WTO in 2001 have cast a shadow over the Doha Round
negotiations (Wolfe 2013). It has been argued that some developing countries are reluctant
to cut tariffs on importedmanufactured goods in the context of aWTO agreement because,
Fig. 9 Combining the effects of unilateral tariff reform and the LTFR rule
Fig. 10 Unilateral tariff reform plus LTFR rule as a stumbling block
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according to theMost Favored Nation principle, suchmarket openingmust be extended to
all WTO members, including China. On this view, intra-South dynamics are said to be
important not only North–South dynamics (Donnan 2013).
To explore these matters the framework developed in the previous sections must be
modified. The simplest way to do so is to assume the South comprises two developing
countries (China and non-China), each with their own ratification constraint. 24
Ratification by the South requires the assent of both developing countries and so the
South’s ratification constraint is given by the lower envelope of ratification constraints
of the countries that comprise it. In Fig. 11 the Chinese and non-Chinese ratification
constraints are given by ABC and DBE, respectively. The South’s ratification constraint
is the lower envelope of these two constraints, given by DBC. For the moment the
Northern ratification constraint is unchanged.
Now consider the impact of an unanticipated increase in Chinese export competi-
tiveness. To the extent that greater import competition reduces the number of domestic
firms and the profitability of surviving firms, the rise of China could in principle reduce
the political clout of import-competing interests and relax ratification constraints in the
North and in the non-China South. In some cases this could result in a landing zone
being created where previously there had been an impasse. This, however, is not the
only logical possibility.
Unanticipated increases in Chinese export competitiveness could embolden oppo-
nents to multilateral trade liberalization that seek to keep as much protection against
Chinese imports as possible. These opponents may argue that since further increases in
Chinese competitiveness cannot be ruled out, that the option to impose protection is
valuable, even if it is never exercised. Ratification constraints in the North and non-
24 To fix ideas assume that the tariff cut by China and the non-Chinese country in the South are the same,
reflecting their shared status as developing countries. Therefore, like before, an agreement is a pair of tariff
cuts, one for the North and one for the South, that satisfies every ratification constraint and the LTFR rule. An
obvious extension is to allow for different tariff cuts by China and the non-Chinese developing country. In
which case, each ratification constraint would be a function of three tariff cuts.
Fig. 11 Unanticipated improvements in Chinese competitiveness may tighten ratification constraints
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Chinese South may then tighten. In Fig. 11 this amounts to the non-Chinese South’s
ratification constraint shifting from DBE to FGH, causing the South’s overall ratifica-
tion constraint to shift to FGC. The North’s ratification constraint shifts up too,
reducing any landing zone. So long as the new ratification constraint of the South lies
above the Full Reciprocity line (the 45° line) then it will be the shift in the North’s
ratification constraint that matters, intersecting as it does with the LTFR rule. In this
case the intra-South dynamics caused by the Chinese export juggernaut would not
create a Doha Round impasse. Nor must unexpected improvements in Chinese com-
petitiveness result in an impasse for its consequence could be to reduce the landing
zone, not necessarily to eliminate that zone.
Another argument made concerning the Doha Round deadlock is that China believes
the terms of its WTO accession were so onerous that, for all intensive purposes, the
implementation of those accession terms is its contribution to the Doha Round.
Fig. 12 The legacy of Chinese accession
Fig. 13 Alternative LTFR rules: non-reciprocity could take many forms
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Suppose attitudes hardened in Beijing and Chinese unwillingness to liberalize in the
context of the Doha Round became apparent. In Fig. 12 this would be represented by a
shift in the Chinese ratification constraint from ABC to JFG, effectively shifting down
the overall South’s ratification constraint from DBC to DFG, a change that in this case
would not result in an impasse. Even if the Chinese ratification constraint shifted down
to HI, then this would reduce the size of the landing zone but not eliminate it.
As Figs. 11 and 12 show, it is difficult to see how splits within the developing
countries alone are responsible for the Doha Round impasse. However, the combina-
tion of those splits and other factors that markedly increase the negotiating demands of
the North (some of which have been identified in earlier sections) could account for a
Doha Round impasse.
8 Concluding remarks
Apart from the impact of the Great Recession, the failure to complete the Doha Round of
multilateral trade negotiations is probably the most significant event in the world trading
system during the past 10 years. Unless negotiations can be concluded successfully, the set
of accords covered by WTO dispute settlement will not expand. Moreover, trade policy
analysts are divided as to how much traffic the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the
WTO can bear before inducing a backlash from member governments. Understanding why
the Doha Round impasse arose is important—yet there are few analyses available to guide
our thinking.
In this paper I developed a simple framework that brings together a number of the
features associated with the Doha Round, grounding the analysis in a traditional two-
stage negotiation-and-ratification set up. Doha Round impasses are possible under a
number of different situations. Each feature is represented graphically in a single
diagram, allowing for the interaction between different factors to be examined. More
generally, this paper adds to the small number of analyses of deadlocks in international
negotiations (Odell 2009; Narlikar 2010; Elsig and Dupont 2011). Having said this, it
would be churlish to claim that every potential contributor to the Doha impasse
mentioned in the commentary of recent years has been assessed here. Clearly more
analysis is needed.25
It cannot be denied that in seeking to analyze the Doha Round impasse in a two-
dimensional diagram some potentially relevant features have been suppressed. Explicit
modelling choices were made here. For example, the focus on a single index of trade reform
(which for labelling purposes were referred to as tariffs) does not allow trade-offs between
trade policy instruments to be considered. Moreover, some might prefer that the ratification
constraints be derived from an underlying political economy model of trade policy, with a
tug of war between different interest groups and possibly different sectors. What matters in
this analysis is that such a ratification constraint exists and ismonotonic. These observations,
however, indicate where extensions might be developed.
25 I have applied the same framework to events or initiatives that might break the Doha Round impasse,
including the inclusion of a special safeguard mechanism for agricultural trade, a severe recession in the North,
and the conclusion of a substantial agreement to liberalize trade in services. Details are available upon request.
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Perhaps the most important finding is that, as feature after feature is added to the
analysis, the size of the landing zone (representing the set of mutually acceptable Doha
Round outcomes) contracts and, in some cases, an impasse results. Such a finding casts
doubt on any one factor being solely responsible for the failure to conclude the Doha
Development Agenda.
Arguably some of these factors were not known in 2001 when the Doha Round was
launched, therefore putting all the blame on poor design is probably inappropriate. That
subsequent events could have contributed to the impasse highlights the role of contin-
gency in determining the success of international negotiations. Incidentally, such
contingency begs the question as to the degree to which prior GATT and WTO
successes were due to extraneous political and economic dynamics?
The analysis developed here raises further questions for officials and policy-oriented
analysts. The first matter to be considered is, assuming that the objective of tilting the
Doha Round negotiation to the benefit of developing countries is to be retained, are there
alternative Less Than Full Reciprocity rules that meet this objective without reducing the
landing zone that much? Figure 13 presents alternatives to the LTFR rule considered in
this paper. The three alternatives portrayed differ, yet each is predicated upon a minimum
degree of Northern trade reform. Questions of this type are partly normative, so the
likelihood of reaching an agreement should not be the only evaluation criteria.
The potential tension between unilateral trade reform and multilateral trade reform
deserves further thought. As argued above, the argument is not that the tension always
exists. However, so long as the reduction in bindings are not valued in their own right,
and binding overhangs of the current magnitude remain, then negotiating a mutually
acceptable Doha Round deal remains a distant prospect. In the absence of substantial
reversals of unilateral trade reform, perhaps this spells the end of the road for WTO
negotiations on agriculture and manufacturing. If so, should the emphasis shift to
expanding the remit of the WTO rules? Or should the focus become negotiating further
service sector reforms? Or ought the often-asserted view of the limited gains from
binding prior unilateral trade reforms be subject to greater scrutiny?
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